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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Civil Rights- Employment Discrimination- SECTION 1985(c)
UNAVAILABLE TO VINDICATE TITLE VII RIGHTS
Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny,
99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979)
In Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Novotny,' the Supreme Court held that the deprivation of a right
created by Title VI 2 cannot be the basis for a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c). 3  The decision is significant because it
will prevent many victims of employment discrimination from
1 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). This statute provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or re-
fuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976) [hereinafter cited as § 703(a)J.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment ... because he has
opposed any practice made unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976) [hereinafter cited as § 704(a)].
3 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976). This section provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the pur-
pose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Ter-
ritory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the
equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by
force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from
giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the
election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice
President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any
citizen in person or property on account of such support o- advocacy; in any
case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein
do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having
and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party
so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages oc-
casioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the con-
spirators.
The 1970 codification of § 1985 was subdivided (1)-(3), instead of (a)-(c). All references in
this Note to § 1985(3), including those in quotations. have been changed without further
indication to § 1985(c) to avoid confusion.
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seeking redress directly in the federal courts. In addition, Novotny
may have sounded the death knell for section 1985(c) as a remedy
for the vindication of federal rights in other instances.
I
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Congress enacted section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
the source of section 1985(c), to enforce newly created fourteenth
amendment rights.4 In the first eighty years following its enact-
ment, the Supreme Court rarely examined what is now section
1985(c). 5 Then, in Collins v. Hardyman,6 the Court concluded that
the statute protected an individual only against state action depriv-
ing him of his federal rights.' In 1971, however, the Court in
Griffin v. Breckenridge,' without expressly overruling Collins, ex-
4 Section 1985(c) originated in the Act of April 20, 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act), ch. 22, § 2, 17
Stat. 13 (originally codified in Rev. Stat. of 1874, § 1980). For discussions of the legislative history
and relevant background of this statute, see CommentA Construction of Section 1985(c) inLight of its
Original Purpose, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 402 (1979); Note, The Reach of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); Sex
Discrimination as a Gauge, 25 CLsv. ST. L. REv. 331, 332-39 (1976). See generally Note. The Scope of
Section 1985(3) Since Griffin v. Breckenridge, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 239, 242 (1977); Note, Section
1985(3): A Viable Alternative to Title Vllfor Sex-Based Emplo)yment Discrimination, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q.
367, 377-79.
5 The Court heard at least two cases involving the precursors of § 1985(c) during this
time but did not construe that section. 99 S. Ct. at 2348 n.8. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321
U.S. 1 (1944) (violations of §§ 1983, 1985(c) alleged but not considered where plaintiff had
not shown constitutional violation); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (discussing § 1983
claim but not § 1985(c) claim).
6 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
There, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to deprive them of "equal
privileges and immunities under the laws" in a manner contemplated by the statute by
infringing upon their right to assemble peaceably "for the purpose of discussing and com-
municating upon national public issues." Id. at 654. Plaintiffs also claimed that defendants
interfered with their right "to petition the government for redress of grievances." Id. They
did not contend, however, that their claim arose under the fourteenth amendment or that
there was any state involvement whatsoever. Id. Citing potentially complex constitutional
problems it was unwilling to resolve, the Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to state a
claim under the statute; the facts alleged fell short of showing "a conspiracy to alter, impair
or deny equality of rights under the law .... Id. at 662, Collins, therefore, established the
rule that § 1985(c) applied only to conspiracies involving state action. Under this restrictive
interpretation, § 1985(c) offered little assistance to prospective litigants injured by private
conduct.
8 403 U.S. 88 (1971). The complaint in Griffin alleged that black plaintiffs riding with
a white driver on public roads in Mississippi were stopped, assaulted, and beaten by white
defendants who mistook the driver for a civil rights worker. Id. at 89-91. Plaintiffs alleged
deprivations of their first amendment rights to freedom of speech, association, and assem-
bly as well as their right to interstate travel. Id. at 89-91. See generally Note, Federal Power to
Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era
Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 495-500 (1974); Note, supra note 4, 45 GEO. WASH. L.
1979]
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tended section 1985(c) to reach private acts of discrimination in
some situations.9 The Griffin Court found "nothing inherent in
the phrase [equal protection] that requires the action working the
deprivation to come from the State." 10 It read "equal
protection" and "equal privileges and immunities under the
laws" as used in section 1985(c) to mean "equal enjoyment of
rights secured by law to all.""I Mindful that such a broad in-
terpretation might effectively create a general federal tort law, the
Court harnessed this potential expansion of section 1985(c) by re-
quiring that there be some "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators'
actions." 12
The Griffin Court did not clearly indicate whether section
1985(c) created new substantive rights, or merely provided a rem-
edy for pre-existing rights. The majority held that Congress was
empowered to enact this section under the enforcement clause of
the thirteenth amendment.1 3  Alternatively, the Court upheld the
statute, on the facts of Griffin, as an exercise of congressional
power to protect the right of interstate travel. 4 By holding that
section 1985(c) could be invoked to protect an individual against
deprivation of equal enjoyment of a pre-existing "legal right"--the
REv. at 240; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 56, 240 (1976). Griffin is
noted in Note, The Resurrection of the Civil Rights Act of 1866: Its Effect upon Modern Legisla-
tion and Current Litigation, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 277 (1971); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85
HARV. L. REv. 38, 95-104 (1971); 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 635 (1972); 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 199;
47 WASH. L. REv. 353 (1971).
9 403 U.S at 101-02.
10 Id. at 97.
11 Id. at 101.
"2 Id. at 102. For a plaintiff to present a valid claim under § 1985(c), he must, accord-
ing to the Griffin Court, satisfy a four-part test:
[The] complaint must allege that the defendants did (1) "conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another" (2) "for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws." It must then assert that one or more of the conspirators (3) did, or
caused to be done, "any act in furtherance of the object of [the] conspiracy,"
whereby another was (4a) "injured in his person or property" or (4b) "deprived
of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States."
Id. at 102-03.
"3 Id. at 105. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
14 403 U.S. at 105-06. The Court indicated that the potentially limitless scope of the
right to travel might, in effect, permit a general tort law despite the discrimination animus




right to interstate travel-the Court emphasized the section's re-
medial aspect. 15
At the same time, however, the Court intimated that section
1985(c) has substantive content as well.16  It suggested that the
plaintiffs stated a cause of action under section 1985(c) when they
alleged that the individual defendants had deprived them of first
amendment rights.1 7  If section 1985(c) was purely remedial, such
a deprivation could not trigger it because the Constitution pro-
hibits only governmental infringement of first amendment rights.,'
If a private deprivation was actionable in Griffin, section 1985(c)
must create substantive rights.'9 Moreover, when the Court iden-
tified the thirteenth amendment as the source of congressional
power to enact the section, it hinted that section 1985(c) was a
substantive statute designed to eliminate badges and incidents of
slavery. °
Not surprisingly, in the wake of Griffin lower courts disagreed
as to whether section 1985(c) is substantive or purely remedial.21
15 A remedial statute provides a remedy for violation of the rights it designates,
whereas a substantive statute creates rights itself. 99 S. Ct. at 2349. See The Supreme Court,
1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REv. 38, 99-100 (1971).
16 Id.
17 403 U.S. at 103.
18 See Note, Civil Rights-State Action is a Requirement for the Application of Section 1985(3)
to First Amendment Rights, 54 N.C.L. REv. 38, 99-100 (1971).
"8 See The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 38, 99-100 (1971).
20 403 U.S. at 405. The Court relied heavily on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392-
U.S. 409 (1968), a case involving a substantive statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1982. 403 U.S. at 105. See
The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 38,99-100 (1971). In his separate concurrence,
Justice Harlan went even further. He refused to rely at all on the deprivation of the right
to interstate travel to trigger § 1985(c). 403 U.S. at 107. This stance probably stemmed
from Justice Harlan's view that the right to interstate travel was not assertable against
private persons. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 763 (1966). Yet the right to
interstate travel was the only existing legal right which could have been violated in Griffin.
Thus Justice Harlan must have believed § 1985(c) to be substantive.
21 The courts essentially disagreed as to whether state action is required when a plain-
tiff claims a deprivation of a fourteenth amendment right. If a § 1985(c) claim is assertable
notwithstanding the absence of state action, § 1985(c) is substantive. The Fifth and Eight
Circuits generally did not require state action. See Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d
206, vacated as moot, 507 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1975); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th
Cir. 1971). The Fourth and Seventh Circuits usually required state action. See Murphy v.
Mt. Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976); Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539
F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976); Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975);
Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972); Flores v. Yeska, 372 F. Supp. 35
(E.D. Wis. 1974). See also Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975); Richardson
v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494
(W.D. Pa. 1974); Brown v. Villanova Univ., 378 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Stern v.
Mass. Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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Courts have struggled with two other questions Griffin left
unanswered: what classes are protected by section 1985(c), 2 and,
more importantly, what rights can be vindicated through section
1985(c). 3
22 403 U.S. at 103. This determination involves the second element of the four-part test
fashioned in Griffin. See Note, supra note 4, 25 CLEv. ST. L. REv. at 356; see generally note
12 supra. Most courts treat this as the threshold requirement of a § 1985(c) claim. Note,
supra note 18, at 680. See also Note, supra note 4, 45 GEO. WASH. L. Rzv. at 256. In this
manner courts are often able to avoid the more difficult question of whether the right
involved is within the statute. See Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d
1235, 1241 n.19 (3d Cir. 1978). In application, the cases show a lack of clear understand-
ing of what constitutes class-based discrimination. 90 HARv. L. REv. 1721, 1728 (1977).
Generally, when the defendant's conduct was motivated by characteristics peculiar to the
plaintiff, many courts dismiss § 1985(c) claims. Id. at 1728. See, e.g., Dacey v. Dorsey, 568
F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1978); Lesser v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 518 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1975). But
see Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1972) (family harassed by neighbor qualified as
class).
Some courts have held that discrimination against women satisfies the class-based
animus requirement. See Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975); Reichardt
v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp.
494 (W.D. Pa. 1974). But see Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.
1973). cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976). See generally 90 HAgv. L. REv. 1721, 1728 (1977).
23 The language of § 1985(c) requires that the conspiracy seek a deprivation of "equal
protection of the laws, or equal privileges and immunities under the laws." Courts ap-
proach this phrase differently. Some consider only rights derived from the Constitution in
determining whether § 1985(c) was violated. See Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d
818, 828 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Dombrowski v.
Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, J.); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
460 F. Supp. 399, 407-11 (W.D. Okla. 1978); Rehbock v. Dixon, 458 F. Supp. 1056, 1063
n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Abbott v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 643 (D.N.H.
1977) (stating that courts interpret Griffin to require rights protected by one of three
sources, citing Dombrowski: thirteenth amendment, right to interstate travel, or the four-
teenth amendment); Hohensee v. Dailey, 383 F. Supp. 6, 10 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (citing Dom-
browski and stating "§ 1985(c) only recognizes a right of action against private individuals
conspiring to deprive a person of his rights under the equal protection clause of the Con-
stitution."). Cf Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (explaining that
Dombrowski limited Griffin to its particular factual situation thus holding that § 1985(c) only
extends to conspiracies premised on constitutional rights that have not traditionally re-
quired state action). Other courts suggest that § 1985(c) protects statutory rights. See Life
Ins. Co. of North America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979) (§ 1985 requires
deprivation of "any legally protected right"); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978); McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d
919, 927 (5th Cir. 1977) (right protected by § 1985(c) is the right not to be victimized by
another's illegal behavior); Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 838-39 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976) (statutory right to vote in Indian tribal elections is protected by
§ 1985(c)); Hodgin v. Jefferson, 447 F. Supp. 804, 808 (D. Md. 1978) (violation of Equal
Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206); Local Teamsters Union v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 419 F. Supp.




Courts have often addressed the latter issue in employment
discrimination cases.24 Plaintiffs have argued that the conspirato-
rial deprivation of a right guaranteed by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is a denial of "equal privileges and immunities
under the laws" within the meaning of section 1985(c).2 5  Courts
faced with such claims have reached conflicting results. Some
have taken the view that statutory rights, such as those created by
Title VII, cannot form the basis of a section 1985(c) claim.
26
Others have held that section 1985(c) provides a remedy for vio-
lations of statutory rights, but that Title VII preempts section
1985(c) in employment discrimination cases.27 Still others have
maintained that Tide VII creates rights which can be vindicated
through the remedial framework of section 1985(c).
28
II
GREAT AMERICAN FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION V. NOVOTNY
Novotny filed suit in federal district court against Great
American Federal Savings & Loan Association, his former
employer. He alleged that the Association fired him because he
charged management with discrimination against female
24 The determination of which classes § 1985(c) protects (described in note 22 supra)
carries much less significance in employment discrimination cases than in other contexts.
Title VII, the statute creating the right sought to be asserted through § 1985(c) in Novotny
also contains a legislative determination of classes of victims subjected to discrimination in
employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). These classes include race, color, religion,
sex, and national origin. Id.
2' See, e.g., Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir.
1978); see generally Brooks, Use of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1871 to Redress Employment
Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 258 (1977); 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 369.
11 Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 1974). See 99 S. Ct. at 2355
(concurring opinion, Stevens, J.); note 23 supra.
27 Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326, 1333-34 (4th Cir. 1976); Hodgin v.
Jefferson, 477 F. Supp. 804, 808 (D. Md. 1978). Cf. Schatte v. International Alliance, 182
F.2d 158, 166-67 (9th Cir. 1950) (§ 1983 precluded from remedying rights protected by
NLRA; NLRA remedies held exclusive).
21 Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1251-53 (3d Cir.
1978); Marlowe v. Fischer Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973); Beamon v. W.B. Saunders
Co., 413 F. Supp. 1167, 1176-77 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Milner v. National School of Health
Tech., 409 F. Supp. 1389, 1394-95 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Fannie v. Chamberlain Mfg. Corp.,
Perry Div., 445 F. Supp. 65 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 386 F. Supp.
341, 348 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
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employees. 29  Novotny claimed violations of section 1985(c) and
of section 70430 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."'
The remedies of Title VII were available to him, but he sought
redress through section 1985(c) which allows plaintiffs to recover
compensatory and punitive damages. Title VII only provides for
reinstatement and a maximum of two years' back pay.
3 2
The district court dismissed Novotny's complaint," but the
Third Circuit, sitting en banc, unanimously reversed.3 4  In a
lengthy and well-reasoned opinion, the court of appeals con-
cluded, inter alia, that a male plaintiff injured by collusive action
to deprive women of equal employment opportunities resulting in
a violation of Title VII could assert a claim under section
1985(c). 3 5  The court also held that Title VII did not preempt the
use of section 1985(c) as a remedy for the violation of rights
created by Title VII.36
29 Novotny was secretary of the Association, and a member of its Board of Directors.
584 F. 2d at 1237. He was discharged after he expressed support for a female employee
who accused the Association of sex discrimination. 584 F.2d at 1238. The only unique
aspect of this case is that Novotny was injured as a male advocate rather than as the direct
victim against whom the discrimination was focused. See 584 F.2d at 1237. Nothing in this
case turned upon that distinction, however.
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976).
31 584 F.2d at 1238.
32 99 S. Ct. at 2350 n.16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
33 430 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Pa. 1977). On the § 1985(c) claim, the court ruled that
Novotny had individually suffered only a single act of "business entity" discrimination and
this failed to constitute a conspiracy. Id. at 230. On the Title VII claim, the court ruled that
Novotny had not opposed "a practice made unlawful by Title VII." Id. at 231.
34 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978).
31 Id. at 1251. The court's analysis began with the words of § 1985(c). Id. at 1246.
Judge Adams reasoned that the language " 'equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws,' connotes the existence of laws outside of § 1985(c)
which define the 'protection' and 'privileges and immunities' that are guaranteed against
invasion." Id. at 1247 (emphasis in original, footnotes deleted). The court's reading of the
congressional debates on the adoption of the statute supported this construction. Id. at
1247. The court admitted that the 1871 Congress could not have specifically anticipated a
federal statute enacted far in the future. Id. at 1249. Still, "as a matter of ordinary lan-
guage the words of § 1985(c) clearly embrace a statutorily provided right of equal
employment opportunity within the rubric 'equal privileges and immunities under the
laws."' Id. at 1249. But see Comment, supra note 4, 46 U. CHi. L. REv. at 432-36, 438
(concluding that § 1985(c) was not intended to protect statutory rights).
36 Id. at 1252-53. The court of appeals specifically addressed the issue of whether
§ 1985(c) conflicts with Title VII. The defendants argued that the rule of Doski v. M.
Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976), should apply. In Doski, the Fourth Circuit
held that Title VII mechanisms precluded a § 1985(c) remedy because otherwise plaintiffs
could bypass those administrative procedures by bringing a § 1985(c) action. The Third
Circuit rejected this preemption argument. 584 F.2d at 1251. In the court's view, it could
only exclude § 1985(c) as a remedy if Title VII worked a partial repeal of that section. Id.
at 1252. But, as the court noted, repeals by implication are not favored and only occur
120
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether
section 1985(c) applied to the facts alleged in Novotny's com-
plaint.37  Without attempting to explain the ambiguities arising
from Griffin, a six to three majority concluded that the provision
was purely remedial.38 The Court thus avoided implied repeal of
any existing rights; under its view of section 1985(c) the right as-
serted by Novotny did not exist prior to the passage of Title VII.
The Court then inferred from Title VII's complex administrative
scheme that Congress had intended Title VII to be the exclusive
remedy in cases where it created the right allegedly violated.3 9
The facts of Novotny presented the Court with the opportu-
nity to determine what types of rights a plaintiff can assert through
section 1985(c). The Court could have discussed the distinction
between federal rights created by statute and constitutional
rights, 40 but it explicitly avoided this issue.4' Instead it held that
Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for the violations that
Novotny alleged.
where two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict. Id. at 1252. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160, 173 n.10 (1976). The court could discern no such conflict in Novotny. 584 F.2d at
1252.
:7 99 S. Ct. at 2348.
1 Id. at 2349. This determination was crucial to the Novotny holding. It allowed the
Court to follow the congressional policy against implied repeal and to avoid conflicting
with precedent. See notes 42-45 and accompanying text infra. If § 1985(c) creates no rights
there is no chance of contravening such policy. In light of the confusion surrounding
Griffin (see notes 15-21 and accompanying text supra), it is disturbing that the Court of-
fered no explanation for this holding. In any case, Justice White, in his dissent, made a
strong argument supporting the substantive nature of § 1985(c). He assumed the majority's
broad holding that the "deprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot be a basis for a
cause of action under § 1985(c)" was aimed at Novotny's § 703(a) claim; his § 704(a)
claim was merely a peculiarity of the case. See note 2 supra. Justice White then argued that
because on its face § 1985(c) provides a remedy for any person injured as a result of a
conspiracy which has as its object the deprivation of a federal right, § 1985(c) thus creates
"rights in persons other than those [to] whom the underlying federal right extends." 99 S.
Ct. at 2358. Novotny sought to redress his own injury, an injury distinct from his § 704(a)
claim, caused by a conspiracy to deny others of their § 703(a) rights. Thus, the language of
§ 1985(c) suggests the creation of a new substantive right, the right not to be injured by a
conspiracy to deprive others of their federally guaranteed rights. Id. at 2359.
3" 99 S. Ct. at 2352.
" Although the language of § 1985(c) itself seems to suggest that statutory rights
would fall within the ambit of its remedial structure (but see Comment, supra note 4, 46 U.
CHi. L. REv. at 432-36, 438), the Supreme Court has never so held. See note 3 supra.
41 The majority explicitly stated that there is no need to reach the issue of whether
"section 1985(c) creates a remedy for statutory rights other than those fundamental rights
derived from the Constitution." 99 S. Ct. at 2348 n.6. In separate concurrences, Justices
Powell and Stevens both argued that § 1985(c) should be limited to remedying deprivations
of constitutional rights. Id. at 2352-55. Justice White, on the other hand, in his dissent said
that "§ 1985(c) encompasses all rights guaranteed in federal statutes as well as rights
guaranteed directly by the Constitution." Id. at 2357 n.5.
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At first glance, this holding seems to depart from precedent.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 42 established that "the legislative
history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an
individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title
VII and other applicable state and federal statutes."43 The Court
reiterated this position in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 44 hold-
ing that Congress intended Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to
"augment each other." 45
The Novotny Court distinguished these cases, however, by
holding that section 1985(c) lacks substantive content. Unlike the
plaintiffs in Alexander and Johnson, Novotny simply had no rights
independent of Title VII. The Court expressed the distinction by
suggesting that the earlier cases involved "two 'independent' rights"
each with its own remedy, instead of one right with overlapping
remedies. 46  Thus, untroubled by Alexander and Johnson, the
Court was free to find that the integrated complexity of Title
Vii's remedial scheme indicated a congressional intent to bar
plaintiffs in Novotny's position from seeking a remedy through
section 1985(c).
47
42 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
43 Id. at 48.
44 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
While encouragement of private settlement to avoid unnecessary litigation
under Title VII and the preservation of an independent § 1981 action may
appear somewhat at odds, the two themes are reconciled in the context of their
joint remedial purpose: devising a flexible network of remedies to guarantee
equal employment opportunities.
Id. at 472.
45 Id. at 459 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1972)). 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1976), traceable to § 1 of the Act of Apr. 9, 1866, states:
All persons within the *jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.
46 99 S. Ct. at 2352.
47 Id. at 2349-51. Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 (1976), which the Novotny Court relied
on for support, followed an analogous line of reasoning. There the Court was dealing with
§ 717, which Congress added to Title VII when it passed the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, § 11, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976). Section 717 extends the protection
of Title VII to federal employees. The Brown Court found that Congress made this
amendment with the understanding that it provided federal employees their first right of
action for employment discrimination. 425 U.S. at 838. The Court inferred that because
Congress thought there were no other remedies, it intended § 717 to be exclusive. Id. at
828-29, 833-34.
In making this inference the Brown Court stated that "the relevant inquiry is not




Although the Court sought to confine Novotny to narrow
grounds, 48 its approach does not apply solely to Title VII. In-
stead, Novotny represents the addition of a significant restriction
upon the test fashioned in Griffin whenever a statutory right is
accompanied by a "comprehensive scheme."' 49 The validity of a
plaintiffs assertion of a substantive statutory right through section
1985(c) seemingly turns upon whether the congressional policy
demonstrated by the "balance, completeness, and structural integ-
rity" 50 of the statutory remedial scheme would be impaired by
providing a section 1985(c) remedy.
Collateral issues associated with this restriction remain
obscured. For example, in rejecting a section 1985(c) action to
redress conspiracies to violate Title VII rights by finding a "com-
prehensive scheme," the majority did not address the possibility of
don of the state of the law was." Id. at 828. If Congress overlooked any pre-existing rights
when it considered the 1972 amendments, the Brown rationale would extinguish them. Accord-
ing to the Court, however, Congress had previously been solicitious of pre-existing rights in this
context. See notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra. Thus, the Brown Court's inference
that Congress intended to extinguish all pre-existing rights that escaped its notice is uncon-
vincing. Nevertheless, this inference allowed the Court to avoid conflict with Alexander and
Johnson. See notes 42-45 and accompanying text supra. The Court cited the complexity of
Tide VII's remedial scheme as an additional justification for its holding. 425 U.S. at 829-33.
One commentator suggests that the Court decided Brown on policy grounds, reaching
a result contrary to congressional intent. Perhaps the adverse fiscal consequences of afford-
ing a remedy that threatened large damage awards against the federal government moti-
vated the Court to confine aggrieved federal employees to Title VII. See Brooks, supra note
25. Whatever motivated the Court, its reading of congressional intent is suspect. The Sen-
ate Committee that drafted the 1972 amendments to tide VII commented that "neither the
'provisions regarding the individual's right to sue under Title VII, nor any of the other
provisions of this bill, are meant to affect existing rights granted under other laws.'" Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 n.9 (1974) (quoting S. REP. No. 415, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. 24 (1971)).
48 The Court did not decide, although it had the opportunity, that § 1985(c) remedied
only those fundamental rights derived from the Constitution. See 99 S. Ct. at 2348 n.6. On
the other hand, the majority provided no analytical framework describing the nature of the
rights and privileges within the purview of § 1985(c). In concurring opinions, Justices
Powell and Stevens took the position that only constitutional rights were within the ambit
of § 1985(c). See note 41 supra.
49 Conceivably, if the Court had reconciled § 1985(c) with Title VII, the way would be
paved for extending that section to remedy a deprivation of every federal statutory right
where Congress had not expressly provided an exclusive statutory remedy.
"o See 99 S. Ct. at 2351 (quoting Brown v. General Servs. Adm'n, 425 U.S. 820, 832
(1976)).
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accommodating the statutes.5 ' Instead, largely for policy reasons,
the Court simply denied the compatibility of section 1985(c) with
the administrative mechanism of Title VII.52
This approach is unfortunate. The failure to investigate the
compatibility of the statutes ignores section 1985(c). Instead of
balancing the congressional policies underlying both Title VII and
section 1985(c),53 the Court promoted the former at the expense
of the latter. Arguably, it should have sought to accommodate
both, 54 by requiring that any potential plaintiff pursue in good
faith the Title VII remedial scheme with its procedural intricacies
before filing suit under section 1985(c).5 5  In cases where a plain-
tiff asserts a statutory right, accompanied by detailed procedures,
as the basis of a section 1985(c) claim, it is unclear whether courts
should attempt to accommodate the overlapping statutes.
51 The failure to attempt an accommodation of the two statutes must be attributed to
the plurality since the concurring justices contended that only fundamental constitutional
rights may be remedied through § 1985(c).
As an alternative solution to the problem faced in Novotny, an attempt at accommoda-
tion might have allowed the Court to integrate § 1985(c) and Title VII into a coherent
scheme. In this context, one commentator has stated
only the specific exemptions and the procedural requirements that express [na-
tional social policy] determinations need be recognized in the accommodation
process. Areas of non-coverage that reflect limitations in the congressional basis
of power or concern over the difficulties of administrative enforcement ...
need be given no effect in limiting the scope of the earlier statute.
Note, supra note 8, 74 COLUM. L. REv. at 475 (footnote omitted).
In Novotny, as the dissent points out (99 S. Ct. at 2361), incorporating an exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement would reconcile the policies of the two statutes. Al-
though such an approach could conceivably shift the "balance of power" at the conciliation
stage, the trial judge would retain considerable discretion to ensure that any potential
plaintiff proceeded through the administrative process in good faith. Thus, the possibility
of an administrative exhaustion requirement undermines the argument that allowing a
§ 1985(c) claim could permit the Title VII scheme to be completely bypassed. The majority
relied heavily on this argument. 99 S. Ct. at 2351. Consequently, the majority's failure to
address this issue is significant.
51 99 S. Ct. at 2351-52. For example, the Court reasoned that "[u]nimpaired effectiveness
can be given to the plan put together by Congress in Title VII only by holding that depri-
vation of a right created by Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of action under
§ 1985(c)." Id. at 2352.
5' Section 1985(c) is directed at a particularly dangerous and disfavored form of dis-
crimination; that "posed by persons acting with invidious animus and acting in concert-
thereby compounding their power and resources-to deny federal rights." 99 S. Ct. at
2360 (dissenting opinion, White, J.).
54 99 S. Ct. at 2361 (dissenting opinion, White, J.). This is the fundamental rationale
underlying the doctrine of implied repeal. See Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497
(1936). See generally Note, supra note 8, 74 COLUM. L. REv. at 480-85.
55 See note 51 supra.
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In addition, by failing to address the larger question of what
types of rights section 1985(c) vindicates, the Court promoted uncer-
tainty in the lower courts. Some may attempt to limit Novotny to its
facts, according it no precedental effect in cases that do not in-
volve Title VII. The logic of Novotny, however, extends to all stat-
utes with comprehensive remedial schemes. Such statutes should
be the exclusive remedies for any rights they create, thus pre-
empting section 1985(c).
Novotny signalled a retreat from Griffin's expansive interpreta-
tion of this provision. The Court did stop short of declaring that
section 1985(c) remedies only deprivations of fundamental con-
stitutional rights. But if a comprehensive remedial scheme
preempts vindication of a statutory right by section 1985(c), the
section is effectively neutralized with respect to statutory rights;
plaintiffs usually invoke section 1985(c) only to circumvent com-
plex or disadvantageous remedial mechanisms.5 6
The weight of Novotny is likely to fall most heavily on potential
plaintiffs who would assert claims alleging sex-based discrimina-
tion in employment. Victims of racial discrimination 57 in
employment can conceivably still assert a deprivation of section
1981 rights to circumvent the restrictions of Title VII.58 But for
other employment discrimination victims and for the victims of
private, nonracial discrimination in general, there may be no
statutory right which can support a section 1985(c) claim. Unless
these victims can claim a deprivation of their right to interstate
travel, which seems unlikely in most employment discrimination
cases, section 1985(c) will be useless to them.
A vitally important issue which Novotny may generate is
whether section 1983, 5 9 which remedies state infringement of
" See generally Lopataka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal Regulation of Employment Discrimi-
nation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 69, 117.
"' Classifications based on race or alienage would fall under the rubric of racial dis-
crimination, but § 1981 would not extend to classifications based on sex, religion, or na-
tional origin. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
5 In addition to the remedy available under § 1981 which was held not excluded by
Title VII in Johnson, theoretically a victim of nonracial employment discrimination can at-
tempt to establish that § 1985(c) provides a remedy for the right created by § 1981. There
is, however, little practical reason to vindicate such rights indirectly through section
1985(c), since § 1981 provides a right of action and a remedy in these situations directly.
51 42 U.S.C § 1983 (1976). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the de-
privation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
1979]
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fourteenth amendment rights, survives the Court's "comprehensive
scheme" rationale. Lower courts may construe Novotny to preclude
a state employee victimized by discrimination from asserting a sec-
tion 1983 claim in lieu of, or in addition to, a Title VII claim. But
since such a plaintiff must assert a violation of section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment as a component of his section 1983
claim, 60 a right independent from Title VII is present. The "two
independent rights," "one right, two remedies" distinction and the
Novotny Court's emphasis on the exclusiveness of Title VII only as
to rights created solely by Title VII suggest that Novotny should
not affect section 1983.61 Although Novotny severely restricts the
scope of section 1985(c), it probably will not adversely affect other
existing alternatives to Title VII.
62
CONCLUSION
In Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny,
the Supreme Court withdrew section 1985(c) as a remedy for dep-
rivations of rights created by Title VII. The Novotny rationale
necessarily extends to statutes other than Title VII; courts should
read Novotny to preclude the use of section 1985(c) as a remedy
for deprivations of rights created by statutes accompanied by a
comprehensive administrative scheme. Since plaintiffs invoked
section 1985(c) to circumvent such administrative machinery,
Novotny has virtually eliminated the practical utility of that statute.
Michael S. Chernuchin
Scott E. Pickens
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 99 S. Ct. 1905 (1979), the Supreme
Court determined that § 1983 was solely remedial. Id. at 1915-17.
60 See Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1972) (discussing require-
ments of § 1985 claim).
61 In the Novotny opinion itself, the Court noted that during the legislative debates
when the view was consistently expressed that earlier statutes would not be impliedly re-
pealed, specific references were made to §§ 1981 and 1983 whereas § 1985 was not men-
tioned. 99 S. Ct. at 2351, n.21.
62 But the Court's holding that section 1985(c) is purely remedial has a paradoxical
implication. If the Ku Klux Klan attacked a group of blacks, the victims would have no
claim under section 1985(c) unless they could allege deprivations of their right to interstate
travel. After Novotny, section 1985(c).may not even remedy the wrongs which motivated the
Reconstruction Congress to enact it.
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